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Preface 
The report assesses the marginal abatement costs for CO2 emissions in the EU of 
obtaining the 2030 target for the emissions from sources outside the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme under different interpretations of the target. The 
analysis is funded by the Norwegian Environment Agency (Miljødirektoratet).    
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Abstract 
Norway intends to join the EU’s proposed Effort-Sharing Regulation (ESR) that 
regulates the emission sources outside the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) – 
henceforth the NETS sectors. The NETS sectors include domestic transport, 
agriculture and households, among others, and account for almost 60% of total EU 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This analysis estimates the projected 2030 
marginal abatement costs (MACs) for reducing CO2 emissions in EU.  
 
The proposed ESR provides several flexibility mechanisms. The analysis assumes 
full, efficient buying and selling opportunities across borders. Flexibilities 
proposed vis-á-vis the ETS and vis-á-vis the Land Use, Land-Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF) sector are varied. This analysis quantifies the MACs under 
different assumptions about these flexibility mechanisms, about the reference 
emissions and about the abatement of other greenhouse gases (non-CO2 GHGs). 
The basic scenario assumes proportional abatement of all GHGs, disregards 
flexibilities proposed vis-á-vis the ETS and LULUCF sectors and results in a 9% 
CO2 cut in the NETS sectors from the 2030 reference scenario in EC (2016). 11 
other different combinations of assumptions leave us with cuts between 4% and 
18%.  
 
Based on the scenarios, we have estimated the MACs for the NETS sectors by 
means of the global Computable General Equilibrium model SNOW. It can be used 
to assess the marginal costs for meeting different levels of an emission reduction 
target in the EU. The resulting MAC estimates are in the range of 25–158 €/t CO2. 
These moderately low costs partly reflect the relatively low remaining abatement 
commitments on top of reference projections provided by the European 
Commission (EC, 2016) and the member states (EU, 2017b). The estimated MAC 
curve is convex, implying that increasing the abatement ambition in NETS 
increases the MAC relatively more. To address uncertainty, sensitivity analyses of 
alternative assumptions and comparisons with related scenarios in other analyses 
are performed. The SNOW scenarios are within the range of previous findings, and 
sensitivity analysis indicates relatively small impacts of alternative parameter 
choices when emission reductions are relatively small, as in the basic scenario.     
 
We have analysed two scenarios in detail: the basic 9% scenario and the scenario 
representing the largest abatement of CO2, the 18% scenario. The MACs of abating 
9% and 18% in NETS amount to 64 €/t CO2 and 158 €/t CO2, respectively. In both 
these scenarios we see that the Transport sector and Household sector reduce their 
emissions less than the average for NETS, while the Primary and the Other 
industries cut correspondingly more. Comparing the two scenarios reveals that the 
composition of the abatement across sectors is insensitive to the level of the 
abatement ambition. We also find that more than 90% of the abatement is due to 
increased energy efficiency and fuel switching within the sectors; the remaining 
mitigation is attained by downscaling production in the sectors.  
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Sammendrag 
Norge har en intensjon om å bli med i EUs foreslåtte innsatsfordelingsforordning 
som regulerer utslippskildene utenfor EUs kvotesystem, heretter kalt NETS-
sektorene (Non-Emission-Trading-System). NETS-sektorene inkluderer blant annet 
innenriks transport, landbruk og husholdninger og står for nesten 60% av 
utslippene av klimagasser fra EU. Denne analysen anslår marginale rensekostnader 
(marginal abatement costs - MACs) for å redusere CO2-utslipp i EUs NETS-
sektorer.  
 
Den foreslåtte innsatsfordelingsforordningen åpner for fleksibilitet på flere måter. 
For det første vil det være adgang til å kjøpe og selge NETS-utslippsrettigheter 
over landegrensene. På dette punktet forutsetter vår analyse full fleksibilitet. 
Forordningen foreslår videre fleksibilitet både vis-a-vis kvotepliktig sektor (ETS) 
og vis-a-vis endringer i bruk av skog og andre landarealer (LULUCF). Vi 
kvantifiserer MAC-ene under ulike forutsetninger om disse to 
fleksibilitetsmekanismene. Vi varierer også forutsetningene om nivået på utslipp i 
referansebanene og om reduksjonen av andre klimagasser enn CO2. I et 
basisscenario er det lagt til grunn proporsjonal reduksjon av alle drivhusgassene, 
samt ingen fleksibilitet overfor ETS- og LULUCF-sektorene. Dette resulterer i en 
9% reduksjon i CO2-utslipp i NETS sektorene fra 2030-referansescenarioet i EU 
(2016). 11 andre forskjellige kombinasjoner av antakelser gir oss kutt i utslippene 
på mellom 4% og 18%. 
 
Basert på scenarioene har vi estimert en MAC-kurve for NETS-sektorene ved hjelp 
av den globale numeriske generelle likevektsmodellen SNOW. MAC-kurven kan 
brukes til å vurdere marginalkostnadene ved ulike mål for utslippsreduksjon i EUs 
NETS-sektorer. De beregnede MAC-estimatene ligger i området 25-158 € /t CO2. 
De moderate kostnadene reflekterer at de to referanseframskrivningene som ligger 
til grunn fra EU-kommisjonen (EC, 2016) og fra medlemslandene (EU, 2017b), 
allerede viser relativt lave utslipp. Den estimerte MAC-kurven er konveks, noe 
som innebærer at økte ambisjoner om utslippsreduksjoner i NETS øker de 
marginale rensekostnadene relativt mer. Usikkerheten er belyst med 
sensitivitetsanalyser av alternative forutsetninger og sammenligninger med 
tilsvarende scenarioer i andre analyser. SNOW-scenarioene ligger innenfor 
referanseområdet for tidligere analyser, og følsomhetsanalysene indikerer relativt 
liten effekt av alternative parametervalg når utslippsreduksjonene er nokså små.  
 
Vi har analysert to scenarioer i detalj: basisscenarioet på 9% utslippsreduksjon og 
scenarioet som representerer den største reduksjonen av CO2 på 18% 
utslippsreduksjon. MAC-ene med en reduksjon på 9% og 18% i NETS utgjør 
henholdsvis 64 € /t CO2 og 158 € /t CO2. I begge scenarioene ser vi at 
transportsektoren og husholdningssektoren reduserer sine utslipp mindre enn 
gjennomsnittet for NETS, mens primærnæringene og andre næringer kutter 
tilsvarende mer. Sammenligning av de to scenarioene viser at sammensetningen av 
utslippsreduksjonen på tvers av sektorer er lite følsom for nivået på 
utslippsreduksjonen. Vi finner også at mer enn 90% av reduksjonen skyldes økt 
energieffektivitet og substitusjon til mindre utslippsintensive energivarer innad i 
sektorene; Den resterende reduksjonen oppnås ved nedskalering av produksjonen i 
sektorene. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Background and motivation 
When assessing the costs for Norway of fulfilling its 2030 targets, estimates of the 
marginal abatement costs (MACs) of reducing emissions not covered by the EU’s 
Emissions Trading System (ETS) – henceforth the NETS emissions – are pivotal. 
Norway aims for joint action with the EU for the NETS sectors. If full flexibility 
across national borders is obtained, Norway anticipates saving costs of fulfilling 
her Paris commitments. This will depend on the MAC in the EU as compared with 
the MAC of meeting the targets domestically.  
 
The European Commission (EC) proposed the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR) of 
the NETS emissions in July 2016. Norway is negotiating to be part of this. The 
ESR has the purpose of regulating the emission sectors not covered by the ETS for 
the period 2021-2030. On 13th of October 2017, the Environment Council declared 
that the ESR is ready for starting negotiations with the European Parliament (EU, 
2017a). The ESR proposes binding annual, state-specific greenhouse gas emission 
targets for emission sources that fall outside the scope of the Emissions Trading 
System (ETS) – the NETS sectors. These sectors account for almost 60% of total 
EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
 
EU’s common aim for the sector is an at least 30% reduction from 2005, with 
country-specific targets varying between 0 and 40% based on GDP/capita. The 
proposed effort sharing in case Norway joins assigns Norway a 40% reduction 
target. Each participant must follow an emissions reduction path to ensure that its 
emissions continuously decrease throughout the period. The starting point of the 
trajectory calculation is set for 2020, as proposed by the Commission, and will be 
based on the average emissions from 2016 to 2018. 
 
The EU intends to increase flexibility for NETS emission sources to ensure cost-
effectiveness and fairness; see EU (2017a). This analysis looks particularly at the 
role of flexibility mechanisms for the EU’s 2030 target for the NETS sectors. As 
will be elaborated in Section 1.2., there are some flexibility mechanisms in the 
proposed ESR that are central for this study:  
 
i) First, there will in principle be full access to buy and sell allocated allowances 
among all the participating states, which will include Norway if the country 
becomes integrated in the ESR. If efficient mechanisms for such transfers are 
established, the cheapest emission cuts can be accessible for buyers and revenue 
attained for sellers.  
 
ii) Second, as a one-off possibility, the EC proposes that allowances from the ETS 
can be used to meet NETS commitments from 2021-2030. Eligible states are 
allowed to meet part of their targets in NETS by not auctioning some of their ETS 
allowances. EU-wide, this cannot be more than 100 million tonnes (Mt) of CO2 
over the period. The decision on the exact amount an eligible nation will use must 
be notified before 2020 to the EC; this to ensure predictability and environmental 
integrity. 
 
iii) Third, the EC proposes to accept a certain amount of credits from the Land Use, 
Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector. All states will be eligible, but to 
different extents according to their shares of emissions from agriculture. For the 
participants as a whole, the credits are limited to 280 Mt over the entire period 
2021-2030 and to certain land use categories, only. The motivation for this 
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flexibility is that additional action should be stimulated in the land use sector and 
that the mitigation potential is relatively small in agriculture.  
 
iv) A fourth flexibility applies across time periods: In years where emissions within 
a participating state are lower than the annual emission allocation it can bank any 
surplus for use later. When emissions are higher than the annual emission 
allocation borrowing from the following year is allowed by a limited amount. 
1.2. The task and the present analysis 
The task given to Statistics Norway (SSB) by the Norwegian Environment Agency 
(NEA) is to give an assessment of the marginal abatement costs of reducing ESR 
emissions of CO2 in the EU in 2030 under different assumptions. Specifically, we 
vary the assumptions on  
- how some of the flexibility mechanisms in the ESR can be interpreted,  
- from what reference situation the 2030 targets are to be met, and 
- what is assumed about abatement of non-CO2 GHGs (since only CO2 is 
modelled).  
Combinations of these three types of assumptions, as shown in Table 1.1, leave us 
with 12 different abatement scenarios spanning from 4% to 18% reduction targets 
of the NETS CO2 emissions. See also table A.1 in Appendix A for more 
information of the calculations of the reduction targets.  
Table 1.1 Simulated percentage reductions of CO2 in the study 
 
 a: Reductions as for other 
GHGs 
b: No reduction in other  
GHGs 
From R1 From R2 From R1 From R2 
Policy scenarios 1: No adjustment 
for ETS and LULUCF flexibility 9 %1 13 % 11 % 18 %2 
Policy scenarios 2: Adjusted with 
ETS and LULUCF flexibility linearly  4 % 9 % 6 % 13 % 
Policy scenarios 3: Adjusted with 
ETS and LULUCF equally each 
year  6 % 11 % 9 % 16 % 
1 Defined as the basic scenario and one of the key scenarios in this analysis. 
2 Used as the other key scenario in the analysis. 
 
When it comes to the flexibility assumptions, i) buying and selling of allowances 
are assumed to be efficiently and fully implemented (and also be accessible to 
Norway). The policy scenarios differ in their assumptions on whether flexibility 
mechanisms ii) vis-á-vis ETS and iii) vis-á-vis LULUCF are used and, if so, how 
the adjustments are spread across the period 2021 to 2030. In Policy scenarios 1 the 
flexibilities are not exploited. In Policy scenarios 2 they are fully used, and the use 
increases linearly over the period 2021-2030. In Policy scenarios 3 they are also 
fully used and to the same extent in each of the ten years. Also note that the 
analysis does not account for iv) flexibility across years, i.e., we implicitly assume 
that the target for 2030 is not adjusted because of behaviour the preceding years.  
 
The percentage reductions are also affected by from which reference situation the 
target is assumed to be met. NEA specifies two alternatives, R1 and R2 given in 
EC (2016) and EU (2017b), respectively. R1 is based on the projected 2030 CO2 
emissions in the “official” reference path of EC (2016). R2 is based on the sum of 
2030 emissions as projected by each member state, see EU (2017b).  
 
Finally, since the task only includes CO2 emissions, the targets need to be adjusted 
for anticipated abatement of other GHGs. NEA has provided calculations of CO2-
reductions based on two stylised assumptions: a). Proportional abatement for all 
GHGs, including CO2 and b). no abatement of other GHGs in addition to what is 
anticipated in the references R1 and R2. We refer to Appendix A for more details 
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on the task. This analysis uses the global Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
model SNOW. From a given reference situation in 2030, the model simulates CO2-
emission reductions in the EU ESR sectors as given in Table 1.1, and calculates 
uniform marginal carbon prices for the NETS sectors. 
 
Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 the main assumptions underlying the 
analysis and Section 4 the estimated MAC curve based on the simulations. In 
Section 5 we dig deeper into the results by focussing on two key scenarios, while 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. An overview of the SNOW model  
We use the global version of the multi-sector computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model, SNOW1, that is developed to analyse CO2 abatement policies. CGE-
models combine behavioural assumptions about economic agents, all assumed to 
behave rationally, with the assumption that all markets are in equilibrium. Hence, it 
is possible to study economy-wide impacts of policies that are introduced to some 
or all sectors of the economy. The model enables us to compare outcomes of 
different policy regimes ex-ante and to study counterfactual scenarios.  
 
The SNOW model assumes optimising agents: producers maximise profits and 
representative consumers maximise welfare. Labour and capital are mobile across 
all industries within a region, but immobile across regions. Each industry produces 
one good. In addition to production in industries, household consumption, 
government consumption and investments are modelled separately.  
 
The global version of the SNOW model is based on the Global Trade Analysis 
Project dataset (GTAP 9.0), which includes detailed national accounts data on 
production and consumption (input-output tables) together with bilateral trade 
flows and CO2 emissions for up to 112 regions and 57 industries (Aguiar et al., 
2016). The grouping of sectors and regions in the model is optional. See Table 3.1 
for the aggregation of regions and Table 3.2 for the aggregation of sectors used in 
this analysis. 
2.1. Production  
The production technologies of all industries (see Table 3.2) are described by 
nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions that capture the 
combinations of capital, labour, energy and intermediate products in each industry.2  
 
For most commodities, the combination of capital, labour, energy and intermediate 
products that is used in production can change, depending on prices, see Figure 2.1 
and 2.2. Substitution possibilities between different inputs are represented by the 
(constant) substitution elasticities. The elasticity of substitution determines how the 
relative use of inputs changes as the relative prices change. The larger the value of 
the elasticity, the easier it is to substitute one good for another.  
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates that at the top level, a CES aggregate of intermediates trades 
off with an aggregate of energy, capital and labour, subject to a constant elasticity 
of substitution. At the second level, a CES function describes substitution 
possibilities between demand for an energy aggregate and a value-added aggregate 
of labour and capital. At the third level, capital and labour substitution possibilities 
                                                     
1 SNOW is Statistics NOrway’s World model, see e.g. Böhringer et al. (2017a, 2017b). The model is 
programmed in GAMS/MPSGE (Rutherford, 1999).  
2 The nested CES function (Varian, 1992) is standard in CGE models. The functions nest inputs and 
quantify their use according to values for substitution elasticities and share parameters.  
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within the value-added aggregate are captured by a CES function, whereas 
different energy inputs (coal, gas, oil and electricity) enter the energy aggregate. 
Other (non-energy) intermediate inputs are aggregates of domestic and imported 
goods with substitution possibilities.   
 
Production of resource-based goods as extraction of fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) are 
modelled differently in two ways, see Figure 2.2. First, these sectors use fossil fuel 
resources, provided in limited amounts, in addition to other inputs. Second, all 
inputs other than the fossil fuel resources are used in fixed proportions, i.e., the 
substitution elasticities among them are assumed to be 0. Fossil fuel resources are 
sector-specific and country-/region-specific. 
 
Capping or pricing CO2-emissions in production sectors gives incentives to the 
producers to adjust production technologies. The nested CES-functions model this 
without specifying the possible technological or production mode changes. The 
capital-labour-energy aggregate represents possibilities for substituting labour and 
capital for energy, i.e., energy efficiency improvement can take place depending on 
the CES substitution elasticity. Similarly, the energy mix in the lower levels of the 
nests can be altered for given energy input, according to the substitutability in these 
nests.  
 
The CES elasticities determine the potentials for abating CO2 for given policies. 
The values for the elasticities used in the CES-functions are based on international 
empirical studies (see Section 2.5).  Thus, historical data are used to represent 
abatement possibilities in 2030, and Section 6 discusses the reliability of the results 
in light of other forward-looking, comparable studies.  
Figure 2.1 Production technology (nested CES structure) of most goods. L denotes nests with 
Leontief structure, i.e. no substitution possibilities  
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Figure 2.2 Production technology (nested CES structure) for resource-based goods. L 
denotes nests with Leontief structure, i.e. no substitution possibilities 
 
2.2. Household consumption  
Final consumption in each region is determined by the representative household 
who maximises welfare subject to a budget constraint. The representative 
household in each region receives income from the three modelled primary factors 
(labour, capital, and fossil-fuel resources) and tax revenues (net of subsidies) and 
subtracts expenses to fixed investments (i.e., a given demand for savings) and 
government provision of public goods and services (given exogenously) to 
determine the budget constraint.  
 
Consumption demand of the representative agent is modelled with a CES function 
that combines consumption of a composite of energy goods and an aggregate of 
other (non-energy) consumption goods, see Figure 2.3. Similar to the production 
functions, the CES substitution elasticities represent the inclination of households 
to improve energy efficiency, substitute electricity for fossil fuels or change fuel 
mix. Energy goods are used for both transport and heating.    
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Figure 2.3 Household consumption (nested CES structure)  
 
2.3. Trade  
Bilateral trade is specified following the Armington’s differentiated goods 
approach, where domestic and foreign goods are distinguished by origin 
(Armington, 1969). This implies that prices of traded goods may develop 
differently among regions. All goods used in the domestic market in intermediate 
and final demand correspond to a CES composite that combines the domestically 
produced good and the imported good from other regions. Similarly, output can be 
delivered to the domestic market or exported, according to a CET (Constant 
Elasticity of Transformation) function; see Figure 2.1 and 2.2. A balance of 
payment constraint incorporates the base-year trade deficit or surplus for each 
region.  
2.4. Emissions  
The model includes CO2 emissions that stem from energy use; see Figures 2.1 to 
2.3. The CO2 emissions are linked in fixed proportions to the use of fossil fuels in 
production and consumption, with CO2-coefficients differentiated by the specific 
carbon content of fuels. Abatement of CO2 emissions takes place by fuel switching 
or energy savings (either by reduction of production or consumption activities or 
by substitution from fuel to non-fuel inputs). No new climate technologies are 
explicitly modelled, but represented by substitution possibilities as described 
above. 
2.5. Calibration of the model  
We follow the standard calibration procedure for applied general equilibrium 
analysis: the base-year input-output data determine the share parameters of the cost 
and expenditure functions, so that the economic flows represented in the data are 
consistent with the optimizing behaviour of the model agents. The SNOW model is 
calibrated to GTAP data for 2011, and the calibrated solution determines the 
technologies, input-output structures and consumption pattern. 
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Substitution elasticities are taken from pertinent econometric literature. The GTAP 
database provides substitution elasticities in production (between primary factor 
inputs), with substitution elasticities in the range of 0–1 (Aguiar et al., 2016; 
Okagawa and Ban, 2008). Emissions are linked to energy goods in fixed 
proportions, according to base year data. Substitution elasticities in resource-based 
fossil fuel extraction industries are calibrated to match exogenous estimates of 
fossil fuel supply elasticities (Graham, Thorpe and Hogan 1999; Krichene 2002). 
Elasticities in international trade are based on the GTAP database and McDaniel 
and Balistreri (2002). We present sensitivity analysis of the international trade 
elasticities; see Section 6.1. The econometric literature is scarce on CES estimates 
in household consumption, and substitution elasticities are set in the same range, 0-
1. 
3. Assumptions in the analysis 
Projecting future emissions and MACs involves large amount of information, 
including anticipations of developments in technologies, preferences, economic 
conditions, etc.  The model tool and the approach we use for projecting the 2030 
marginal abatement costs of different NETS climate policy ambitions are based on 
a number of assumptions, simplifications and standardised procedures. This section 
outlines the main assumptions made.  
 
Both because of the complex economic system and because future projections are 
the task, the conclusions must be interpreted with caution. To assess the robustness 
of the results of the present analysis, we use two main approaches:  
- sensitivity analysis, 
- comparisons with other, related studies.  
 
The sensitivity analysis of trade-related elasticities is presented in Section 6.1. 
Several sections involve comparisons with other studies: We compare the reference 
scenario simulated with the SNOW model with the reference scenario in EC (2016) 
in Section 3.3 below. The responses of capping CO2 emissions in SNOW is 
compared with those in Aune and Fæhn (2016) and IEA (2012) in Section 6.2, 
while the relative magnitudes of technological vs. downscaling responses are 
assessed compared to existing results for Norway in Section 5.1. See also 
conclusions in Section 7.  
3.1. Model assumptions  
The model we use is calibrated to 2011 as mentioned above. This implies that 
benchmark data, technologies and policies are as in 2011. Abatement policies are 
implemented in the model as exogenous emission caps. We assume that the 
emission caps are met by uniform carbon pricing faced by the agents in the covered 
sectors. These can for example be regarded as cap-and-trade systems; cf. Section 4. 
The uniform carbon prices represent the marginal abatement costs corresponding to 
each target and will be computed by the model.  
 
The emission constraints can be specified for each sector and each region 
separately or for groups of regions and sectors. We have aggregated the data to 8 
regions and 15 production sectors; see Table 3.1and 3.2. Important to note here is 
that EUR is one aggregate region, comprising the EU and EFTA except Norway. 
Norway is a separate region.   
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Table 3.1 Regions in the current SNOW version  
Code Explanation   
NOR Norway 
EUR European Union (and EFTA without Norway) 
USA United States 
CHN China and Hong Kong 
OOE Other OECD 
G20 Other G20 
OEX Oil exporters 
LIC Other low income countries 
MIC Other Middle income countries 
 
The 15 production sectors include five energy sectors: Coal, Crude oil, Natural 
gas, Refined oil and Electricity. This disaggregation of energy goods enables us to 
differentiate energy goods by CO2 intensity and degree of substitutability. 
Commercial air, water and land transportation are distinguished. Primary industries 
include agriculture, forestry and fishery. All remaining industries are aggregated 
into one sector (Other).  
 
Table 3.2 also shows how the sectors are distributed between NETS and ETS. 
Given the aggregation, we are not able to place sectors partly in NETS and partly 
in ETS, so we chose the category where most of the sectors’ emissions belong. 
Note that we have not modelled a third category for sectors covered by neither ETS 
nor NETS. This is not realistic; large parts of the transport activities are 
international and not covered by national commitments. This particularly applies to 
transport by air and water. Since this study focuses on NETS, we have placed these 
two sectors as part of ETS. This will of course affect the results for the ETS 
emissions and MACs, but the indirect effects on NETS results (MACs) turn out to 
be insignificant.3  
 
The NETS emission sectors in the study include transportation on land (labelled 
Transport in Table 3.2), Primary industries, Other industries and Households. It is 
important to bear in mind that this implies that no domestic air and water transport 
forms part of NETS, while international commercial land transport is included. 
This misrepresents the NETS sector somewhat. It is also important to note that 
besides commercial transportation represented by the three transport production 
sectors, transport also takes the form of own transportation by production sectors 
and households.  We cannot distinguish emissions from these activities from other 
emissions from the production sectors and households.  We will come back to 
some of these classification issues in the analysis below.  
                                                     
3See Section 6, where we have investigated the magnitude of such indirect effects in a sensitivity 
analysis. 
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Table 3.2 Production and consumption sectors in the current SNOW version 
Group  Code Explanation  ETS/NETS  
PRODUCTION     
Energy goods COL Coal (extraction and transformation) ETS 
 CRU Crude oil (extraction)  ETS 
 OIL Refined oil (, coal etc.) ETS 
 GAS Natural gas (works) ETS 
 ELE Electricity (and heat)  ETS 
EITE I_S Iron and steel  ETS 
 CRP Chemicals  ETS 
 NFM Non-ferrous metals  ETS 
 NMM Non-metallic minerals  ETS 
 PPP Pulp, paper and printing  ETS 
Transport OTP Transport (by land)  NETS 
 WTP Transport by water ETS 
 ATP  Transport by air ETS 
Other  AGR Primary (industries) NETS 
 AOG Other (goods and service industries) NETS 
CONSUMPTION     
 C Households  NETS 
 G Government  NETS1 
 I Investment  NETS1 
1 These have no or insignificant emissions. Moreover, these sectors are treated as exogenous in the model and will not 
be included as NETS sectors in the analysis.   
3.2. Policy assumptions  
The sectors comprising EU ETS and those comprising NETS have separate 
constraints, and so have the ETS and NETS sectors in Norway. As for the ETS 
sectors, we allow emission trading within the NETS-sectors – also across the EU 
and Norwegian borders. In other words, we model the NETS sectors as a 
hypothetical market for emission allowances, similar to the ETS. Such a market 
can be regarded as a cost-effective way of meeting the target.  
 
We assume that also some other regions (USA, OOE, G20, see Table 3.1) 
implement abatement policies. In the reference case, we assume that these regions 
apply emission reduction targets that are half of those implemented in the EU and 
Norway.  
 
Since one reasonable interpretation of the policy scenarios is that only the NETS 
reduction targets vary as in Table 1.1, we have performed a sensitivity analysis of 
what simultaneously varying the other targets implies. This is found to have 
virtually no effect. We have therefore chosen to vary all targets equally (except in 
the other abating regions than EUR and NOR, where targets are always the half).  
 
The ESR for 2021-2030 sets annual emission reduction targets for each country 
and allows for flexibility across years. This implies that the remaining emission 
cuts necessary in 2030 will depend on the cuts in all previous years. In this study 
we assume that each year’s target is exactly met, including the 2030 target. 
3.3. Comparing reference scenarios   
This section compares two reference scenarios: the reference scenario in SNOW 
and the reference scenario R1 for 2030 in EC (2016), of which detailed information 
is available. The main purpose of this comparison is to assess whether the SNOW-
model (that is based on 2011-data) gives a proper picture of the economy also in 
2030. It is particularly important to reveal possible differences between the levels 
and compositions of energy-related CO2 emissions in the two reference scenarios.  
 
The first observation is that the level of energy-related CO2 emissions in the NETS 
sectors is 25% lower in the 2030 scenario R1 (2844 Mt CO2) than the 2011 base 
level in SNOW (3801 Mt CO2). CGE-models like the SNOW model tend to 
produce equal relative changes as response to relative shifts, irrespective of the 
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reference level. Therefore, if this difference reflects fairly proportional deviations 
in all sectors, i.e. the compositions of emissions are quite similar, the analysis will 
be representative for 2030 if the constraints in the policy scenarios are formulated 
in terms of percentage abatement targets and impacts on quantities and welfare are 
reported in relative terms. This is taken care of by the use of CES functions, 
constant elasticities of scale and no imposed quantitative restrictions on economic 
responses, see also Bye et al. (2016). Therefore, the MACs are reported in terms of 
CO2 prices for different percentage abatement targets.  
 
Second, we observe that the composition of emissions in the SNOW model 
reference scenario and in the EC (2016) reference scenario for 2030, are quite 
comparable, as reflected in Figure 3.1. This eliminates much of the danger that the 
compositions of the emission sources produce MAC differences due to different 
sectoral patterns. Figure 3.1 aggregates the data on emissions from SNOW and the 
reference scenario R1 in order to make the NETS sectors as comparable as 
possible. Note, however, the sector categories are not completely overlapping. One 
difference is that emissions from Households and Primary industries in SNOW 
comprise some emissions from private transportation, while these emissions are 
included in Transport in the reference scenario R1. The sum of their shares is 
therefore most relevant to compare: both constitute 46%. The rest of the NETS’ 
emissions are related to buildings, as well as some stationary combustion for 
machinery in construction, motor vehicles and repairs, etc. The ETS sectors 
constitute 52% and 54% respectively in SNOW and EC (2016). 
Figure 3.1 The composition of emissions in the reference scenarios, SNOW and R1 (EC, 2016) 
 
4. Constructing a MAC curve for the NETS sector  
Figure 4.1 shows the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve for the NETS sector. 
The MAC curve is generated by solving the SNOW model for different emission 
reduction targets and reading out the marginal abatement costs (MACs) for the 
different targets. These cost estimates are found by assuming that the economy as a 
whole minimises the abatement costs in the NETS sectors under a number of 
modelled restrictions, including the present policy interventions (taxes and 
subsidies), the market conditions, the resources in the economy and the external 
international surroundings. This solution will be realised in a competitive market 
for NETS emission allowances. We, thus, simulate such a hypothetical EU-
Norwegian market for emission allowances in the NETS-sector. The allowance 
price (CO2 price) that evolves in this market for each given target, represents the 
MAC corresponding to that target.  
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The MAC curve plots each pair of target and corresponding MAC for all the 
reduction targets in the range estimated by the NEA, 4% to 18% (marked in Figure 
4.1), see Appendix A. In addition, we have extended the range of reduction targets 
in each direction, so that the area from 0 to 30% on the x-axis is covered. This is 
done in order to explore the curvature of the MAC curve. The CO2 price4 – or 
MAC – in the NETS sector can be read from the y-axis.  
Figure 4.1 Marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve for the NETS sector 
 
 
The dots on Figure 4.1 are the results from the model simulations. We have 
estimated the MAC-curve (2nd degree polynomial) from these 12 data points, 
shown by the dotted line. The estimated equation is:  
 
𝑦 = 0.2211𝑥2 + 4.9131𝑥 
 
where y is the CO2-price in NETS (€/t CO2) and x is the emission reduction 
(measured in percent from the reference). The MAC curve is convex, implying that 
a doubling of the reduction target more than doubles the MAC. This also means 
that the total abatement cost, represented by the area below the MAC curve, more 
than quadruples.   
 
Appendix B presents the data underlying the estimation. 
5. Analysing two key policy scenarios: 9% and 
18% reduction targets  
We compare the two reduction targets to investigate how the scale of the ambition 
affects the abatement composition and costs. The 9% reduction target can be 
regarded as a base policy scenario, as it represents the change from the “official” 
reference scenario of EC (2016) to Policy scenario 1 (before any adjustments for 
ETS and LULUCF flexibility). The 18% reduction target is the largest given from 
the NEA, see Appendix A. 
                                                     
4 The data in SNOW is measured in $. We use an exchange rate of €/$ of 1.3 that corresponds to the 
10 years’ average between 2007 and 2017 according to The Norwegian Central Bank. This is chosen 
instead of the base year (2011) rate, because it represented a peak, while the base year data ideally 
should reflect a steady state.   
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5.1. Abatement compositions  
The 9% and 18% reduction targets take place disproportionally across the sectors: 
While the Transport sector and Household sector (where most of the emissions are 
due to private transport) reduce their emissions less than the average, the Primary 
and the Other industries cut correspondingly more; see Table 5.1. This reflects the 
variation in marginal abatement costs in the sectors.  
Table 5.1 Emission reductions in NETS sectors, % 
NETS reduction targets: 9% 18% 
Transport 8% 16% 
Household 8% 16% 
Primary 12% 22% 
Other 13%          25% 
 
The resulting abatement under the two reduction targets (9% and 18%) is 
distributed across the four NETS sectors as shown in Figure 5.1. Though we can 
observe that somewhat more of the reductions take place in Transport as the 
ambition is rising, the composition is fairly insensitive to the scale of the ambition. 
This indicates quite equal steepness of the MAC curves across the NETS sectors.  
Figure 5.1  Composition of abatement across NETS sectors, 9% reduction target (left), 18% 
reduction target (right) 
 
 
It turns out that more than 90% of the abatement is a result of increased energy 
efficiency and change of energy mix within the NETS sectors. The remaining 
mitigation is achieved by reducing the activity level of the NETS sectors. (See 
Figure 6.3 for sectoral information.) The share that takes place as technological 
adaptations (energy efficiency and energy mix changes) is high relative to studies 
of Norwegian abatement responses for 2030 in Fæhn et al. (2013) and Fæhn and 
Aune (2016).   
 
As can be seen from Figure 5.2, it is first of all the use of coal that falls, but also 
gas and refined oil products face reduced domestic demand in EU. There is a 
marked substitution towards electricity in the energy mix.    
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Figure 5.2 EU demand for energy goods with 9% reduction of CO2 emissions (change from the 
reference scenario) 
 
5.2.  Abatement costs  
As explained in Section 4, the CO2 price in NETS reflects the marginal abatement 
cost of a particular reduction target.5 In the 9% case, it amounts to 64 €/t, while the 
18% case (doubling) implies a rise to 158€/t (more than doubling). The relative 
increase is larger than for the abatement because of the convex MAC curve.  
 
The total abatement costs in the two cases can be computed as the area (integral) 
below the MAC curve between zero and the respective reduction target. The 
interpretation is that the smooth MAC curve can be regarded as numerous small 
abatement measures ranked according to their costs per abatement of CO2 
emissions. The larger the abatement ambition, the more measures will be 
necessary, and the higher will be the cost of the last measure (i.e., the marginal 
cost). To find the total costs, we need to sum the costs of all these small measures.  
 
In terms of welfare, the computed total abatement costs in the 9% and 18% cases 
amount to losses of 0,05% and 0,26% of welfare6, respectively. Again, the 
convexity of the MAC implies a large extra cost of doubling the reduction target 
from 9% to 18%.7  These minor estimated welfare impacts do not include the 
abatement costs in other sectors than the NETS sectors, the gains of reduced 
climate effects or other environmental externalities.    
6. Assessing uncertainty  
To assess the robustness of the results of the present analysis, we present sensitivity 
analyses in Section 6.1 and comparisons with other, related studies in Section 6.2. 
Section 6.3. concludes on the uncertainty assessments.   
                                                     
5 The reference scenario includes base year energy taxes, but no explicit CO2-price.    
6 Welfare is measured as the Hicksian equivalent variation, i.e, the household income change from the 
reference scenario that is necessary to restore the utility level (based on ex-ante relative prices).  
7 A linear MAC would result in four times the total abatement cost when doubling the ambition; here 
it is about five times due to the convexity.  
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6.1. Sensitivity analysis  
Obviously, the results of introducing a cap on NETS emissions in the EU will 
differ across model studies depending on the qualitative and quantitative modelling 
of responses to the policy change. Besides the initial composition of emission 
sources, which is addressed in Section 3.3, the responses of policies will depend 
highly on the substitution elasticities in the model, i.e. how easy it is to replace 
activities/goods with each other in response to relative price changes.  
 
Model simulations tend to be sensitive to trade (Armington) elasticities, and the 
empirical estimates in the literature vary. Therefore, the first subsection below 
addresses the sensitivity of the results to the trade elasticities. They determine how 
well domestic and foreign varieties of the same good can substitute each other in 
consumption and as intermediate inputs. Other elasticities could have been chosen, 
as well. In general, increasing (decreasing) elasticities increases (decreases) the 
flexibility of the model, implying that, for instance, emission caps become less 
(more) difficult/costly to meet. Since trade elasticities apply to more or less all 
goods and services in the model, they have a rather generic impact across the 
whole economy. This has also motivated our choice.    
 
The other sensitivity test we have performed concerns the interaction between the 
NETS and the ETS sectors. We investigate how sensitive the marginal abatement 
costs for NETS in the EU are to the assumptions about emissions in the rest of the 
economy. 
6.1.1. Varying the trade elasticities (international competitiveness)   
The marginal abatement costs for the NETS sector depends on to what extent 
European and foreign goods can substitute each other. This sensitivity is found by 
varying the trade elasticities (Armington elasticities; cf. Section 2). Figure 6.1  
presents the MAC curves for NETS for four different sets of trade elasticities. 
Compared to the original case (multiplier = 1), the NETS MAC falls with a 
quadrupling of the trade elasticities. In case of the base scenario, the reduction is 
23%, and with increasing abatement, the relative distant increases.  
Figure 6.1 MAC curves NETS sector for different trade elasticities (1 = original elasticities; 0.5,2,4 = 
multipliers of the original elasticities)  
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One reason for lower MACs with higher trade elasticities is that reducing domestic 
production and substitute it with imports will be less of a sacrifice for Europeans, 
since the goods are perceived as more homogenous. The result is larger European 
output reductions. Because of the higher exposure to foreign competition, prices of 
European goods cannot be raised as much as with the original elasticities without 
large domestic output reductions. European Transport activity does, for instance 
fall by 5% compared with 0,7 % with the original trade elasticities when the NETS 
reduction target is 9%; see Figure 6.2.  
Figure 6.2 Output changes in NETS sectors with emission reduction target of 9%, reference and 
quadrupled trade elasticities  
 
 
When output of the most emission-intensive, trade-exposed NETS goods in Europe 
falls, this facilitates the necessary cuts in emissions at lower marginal abatement 
costs. Compared with the original Armington elasticities case, less of the 
abatement taking place will now be energy efficiency and energy mix changes and 
more will result from output contractions in emission-intensive sectors. Figure 6.3 
illustrates the compositions for the 9% shift. It reflects the larger output 
contractions taking place in Transport when Armington elasticites are quadrupled. 
The flip side of the coin is that loss of European competitiveness gives rise to 
carbon leakage to less regulating regions and a loss in European welfare. 
Figure 6.3 Output changes in NETS sectors, reference and quadrupled Armington elasticities 
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6.1.2. Impacts of caps in ETS and Norway 
In all scenarios, we concentrate on the effects within the EU of varying the NETS 
reduction targets. To investigate how sensitive the marginal abatement costs for 
NETS in the EU is to the assumptions about emissions in the rest of the economy, 
we compare two cases: One with an 18% reduction target in NETS in EU, while 
ETS in EU has a 9% cap (as has the ETS and NETS in Norway) and one with an 
18% reduction target for both ETS and NETS in EU (and Norway); see also section 
5.2. We find that the CO2 price in NETS in this sensitivity scenario is 
approximately the same as in the 18% reduction target scenario, 159 €/t CO2 vs. 
158 €/t CO2. Hence, we conclude that the marginal abatement costs in NETS are 
virtually independent of the targets in ETS (and in Norway). We can therefore 
simulate the same percentage reduction targets in the ETS and NETS sectors when 
the NETS sectors’ marginal abatement costs are calculated. 
6.2. Relating results to other studies  
Another approach for shedding light on the reliability of the analysis is to compare 
the outcomes with other, related studies with other model tools. We compare with a 
study using a partial energy market model for Europe with detailed technology 
specifications projected to 2030, LIBEMOD.8 We also relate the results to IEA 
(2012) that uses an energy system model. None of these analyses explore identical 
policy shifts with our analysis. We discuss the main sources of discrepancies.  
 
The LIBEMOD study in Aune and Fæhn (2016) analyses the 2030 climate targets 
of the EU and Norway and how the degree of flexibility across countries and 
emission sources within and outside the EU ETS may affect the Norwegian 
economy. We have access to detailed output data from this study. One of the 
scenarios assume, as in this report, that there is full flexibility in the NETS sector 
across European countries, including Norway.  
 
The reduction target from the reference situation in Aune and Fæhn (2016) 
amounts to 22%. The marginal abatement cost in the NETS sector is simulated to 
240 €/t CO2 in this scenario. The CO2 tax in the reference situation was 75 €/t CO2, 
so the marginal abatement cost increase from the reference scenario is 165 €/t CO2. 
For comparison, we have simulated a 22% reduction target in SNOW. The 
marginal abatement cost from the SNOW simulation is higher than in Aune and 
Fæhn (2016): 211 €/t CO2. One explanation is that the LIBEMOD study accounts 
for the renewable target in 2030 through subsidised prices in the EU. This means 
that substitution of electricity for fossil fuels is stimulated.   
 
The two models are different in many respects, so a discrepancy cannot be 
surprising. When we go more in detail on the emission compositions in the 
reference situations, and the 22% reduction target, we observe from Figure 6.4 that 
in SNOW the emissions from Households and Other constitute larger shares of the 
reference emissions than in Aune and Fæhn (2016), while Transport is 
correspondingly smaller. (We have included the Primary industries in Transport 
here, because their main CO2 emissions arise from fishing boats, tractors etc.).  
 
We see the same pattern in the shares in the abatement scenarios, which is 
reasonable. However, the abatement is not proportionally distributed. In Aune and 
Fæhn (2016) Transport has a larger share in the abatement scenario than in the 
reference as seen from Figure 6.4, implying that the percentage cut in Transport is 
smaller than for the NETS as a whole. In SNOW the opposite is true, i.e., 
Transport takes on a smaller reduction than 22%. A disproportionally smaller 
                                                     
8 https://www.cree.uio.no/models/libemod/ 
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emission cut in Transport in our study indicates that abating emissions in this 
sector is relatively expensive according to the SNOW model; see also Section 5.  
 
It is important to note that the Transport abatement in Aune and Fæhn (2016) is 
exogenously estimated based on computations from IEA. For the EU, IEA (2012)’s 
2-degree Celsius scenario by 2030 is fairly compatible with EU’s 2030 mitigation 
target. However, the policy assumptions differ: IEA (2012) assumes a cost-
effective solution for the EU, not separated ETS and NETS allowance markets as 
in Aune and Fæhn (2016). Also, the distance to the reference scenario is larger than 
in Aune and Fæhn (26% vs. 22%). Scrutinising the IEA (2012) analysis reveals 
that abatement in the EU’s Transport sector in 2030 is of the same percentage 
magnitude as in the NETS as a whole. In that sense, the result falls in between 
those of this SNOW model analysis and Aune and Fæhn (2016).  
Figure 6.4 Shares of reference emissions and abatement emissions in the SNOW analysis and 
Aune and Fæhn (2016) 
 
 
6.3. Discussion of the uncertainty 
The reliability of the computed MACs will be stronger the less sensitive they are to 
potentially influential, uncertain assumptions in the analysis and the easier it is to 
explain their deviations from, or overlaps, with those of other, convincing studies.  
 
Our conclusions from the sensitivity analyses in Section 6.1 are that for relatively 
small percentage emissions cuts, as in the 9% basic scenario, the sensitivity of the 
MACs to the trade elasticities is modest. The MAC falls by 15 €/t CO2 (23%) when 
trade elasticities are quadrupled. When they are halved, the MAC increases with 8 
€/t CO2 (12%). These relatively small variations are reassuring, though we must 
bear in mind that the larger the abatement, the larger the sensitivity. The sensitivity 
with respect to the emission cap in the rest of the economy is found to be 
insignificant.     
 
The comparisons we made in Section 6.2 shows that SNOW’s computed MACs for 
the NETS sectors in the EU are higher than in Aune and Fæhn (2016). It seems 
reasonable, though, since the latter studies a simultaneous introduction of a cap and 
a renewable target, and this will tend to reduce the necessary emissions price, 
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measured by the MAC. The comparison also showed that Aune and Fæhn (2016) 
found larger cuts in transportation than in other NETS sectors, indicating that the 
costs of abating within transportation are relatively low. The opposite is found in 
the present analysis. SNOW seems to be closer to IEA (2012), where abatement 
costs in the transportation sector was approximately on average. These findings 
lead us to conclude that SNOW produces recognisable cost levels and, also, that 
the sectoral distribution of costs is comparable with other results. It is important to 
bear in mind, however, that the basis of comparison is limited, and that projections 
of future conditions and policies are, per definition, uncertain. Also, the economic 
equilibrium approach is stylised and does not include all the technological details. 
Therefore, it is suitable to studying trends, not details, and broad changes caused 
by the policy in focus. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the policies 
introduced for computing the MACs are emission caps comprising all NETS 
emissions in all EU countries. This is unlikely to characterise the 2030 policies in 
the EU.   
 
One particular uncertainty in climate policy projections is associated with the 
future technological development. We have used four approaches for assessing 
whether the technological assumptions inherent in the calibration to 2011 data are 
relevant for the analysis of 2030: 
(i) Mapped potential discrepancies between the 2011 reference and the 2030 
reference constructed by EC (2016) that accounts for the anticipated 
changes ahead. As shown in Section 3.3, the compositions of emission 
sources in the two references are fairly congruent. The emission levels 
deviate, which has led us to study relative changes from the reference 
instead of absolute values. Based on experience, the levels will not 
significantly affect relative effects of relative changes.  
(ii) Compared the MAC results with related studies. As already concluded in 
Section 6.2, the MACs are fairly in line with Aune and Fæhn (2016). 
(iii) Compared the sectoral composition of the responses to the emission cap 
policies. This is also done in Section 6.2, and the results are recognisable 
from previous studies.  
(iv) Assessed the role of technological adaptation in the responses to the 
emission cap policies. This feature is especially relevant for assessing the 
technological assumptions. As reported in Section 5.1, more than 90 % of 
the abatement takes place by increasing energy efficiency and changing 
energy mix; the rest is explained by reductions of output and consumption. 
That is, even if the detailed technological measures are not specified and 
identifiable, technological adaptations take place at a large scale both in 
consumption and production.  
 
One could argue that between 2011 and 2030 the advancement of climate-friendly 
technologies is expected to increase the inclination to choose technological 
abatement solutions.  Based on the observations reported in (i) to (iv) above we do, 
however, assess the model to have sufficient technological flexibility despite its 
2011 basis and have not found reasons to adjust this characteristic.  
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7. Conclusions  
When assessing Norway’s 2030 climate policy costs, the projected marginal costs 
of an EU-Norwegian joint effort-sharing regulation (ESR) of the NETS sectors are 
important inputs. If full flexibility across national borders is allowed, Norway’s 
government could anticipate lower costs of fulfilling the Paris commitments. A 
previous study by Aune and Fæhn (2016) indicates that achieving the emission 
reduction targets solely within own borders can be costly – a marginal abatement 
cost of between 500 and 600 €/t CO2 equivalent was computed. If it is possible to 
buy emission allowances in the EU, as proposed in the ESR, the costs may be 
substantially lower – between 25 and 158 €/t CO2, depending on different 
flexibility assumptions, according to our computations. The main reason for the 
lower prices in the EU is that EU’s remaining required abatement in NETS sectors 
is relatively modest: between 4 and 18 % from the projected reference emission 
level in 2030.  
 
The proposed ESR provides different flexibility mechanisms. This analysis 
quantifies the EU’s and Norway’s 2030 marginal abatement costs for the NETS 
sectors in a regime with the following flexibility assumptions: i) buying and selling 
is assumed fully flexible in the EU-Norwegian NETS sector, the assumptions 
concerning ii) flexibility vis-á-vis ETS and iv) flexibility vis-á-vis LULUCF are 
interpreted in various ways resulting in 12 scenarios for CO2 emissions reductions 
in the NETS sectors, while we disregard any iv) banking and borrowing across 
years.  
 
The SNOW model for the global economy is used to simulate the 12 scenarios for 
CO2 emissions reductions in the NETS sectors with corresponding MACs. The 
computations are used to construct a MAC curve that can be exploited to assess 
the MACs for the EU of meeting different emission reduction targets in 2030. The 
MAC curve is convex, implying that a relative increase in the abatement ambition 
increases the MAC relatively more. 
 
We have analysed two of the scenarios in detail: 9% and 18% emission reduction 
target. The 9% target is the necessary reduction in NETS from the 2030 reference 
scenario in EC (2016) if we disregard flexibilities proposed vis-á-vis the ETS and 
LULUCF sectors; it can be regarded as a base scenario. The 18% target represents 
the largest emission reduction target of the 12 specified scenarios.  
 
The computed MACs of abating 9% and 18% in NETS amount to 64 €/t CO2 and 
158 €/t CO2, respectively. In both these scenarios the Transport sector and 
Household sector (which includes private transportation) reduce their emissions 
less than average, while the Primary and the Other industries cut correspondingly 
more. This reflects the variation in marginal abatement costs in the sectors. 
Comparing the two scenarios reveals that the composition of the NETS abatements 
across sectors is quite insensitive to the ambition level. This indicates relatively 
equal steepness of the MAC curves across the NETS sectors. More than 90% of the 
abatement is due to increased energy efficiency and fuel switching (change in 
energy mix) within the sectors. The remaining mitigation is attained by 
downscaling of production in the sectors.  
 
The reliability of the computed MACs will be stronger the less sensitive they are to 
potentially influential, uncertain assumptions and the easier it is to explain their 
deviations from or overlaps with those of other, convincing studies. From 
sensitivity analyses and comparisons, we conclude that the MAC results seem 
fairly robust to variations in the model’s degree of flexibility and to the price in 
ETS, and that using 2011 data in the reference does not seem to produce too small 
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technological responses or unrealistic sectoral composition of abatement in 2030. 
Both the MACs and the abatement allocation computed are comparable with 
results found in previous studies for the period.  
 
These findings lead us to conclude that the MAC computations are indicative for 
the range of minimum costs that the EU can expect to face in 2030 in order to 
achieve its mitigation target for the NETS emissions compared to a business-as-
usual reference. The main reasons for careful interpretations of the results are that 
the perspective is forward-looking, that the MAC concept is built on least costs and 
that the general equilibrium outcomes of CGE models like SNOW cannot be 
expected to be observed in any particular future year.  Nevertheless, such analyses 
are useful tools for projecting future trends and comparing economic potentials 
under different policy restrictions.  
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Appendix A: The task from the Norwegian 
Environment Agency  
A.1. The contractual task 
Statistics Norway (SSB) will give an assessment of the costs of reducing emissions 
in the EU for the sectors comprised by the EU’s Effort Sharing Regulation 
(henceforth the ESR sectors) under different assumptions. For this task SSB will 
use the global Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model (SNOW), where the 
EU is aggregated to one region. SNOW only includes CO2 emissions. From a given 
reference situation in 2030, the model will be used to simulate data for percentage 
CO2-emission reductions in the ESR sectors and corresponding marginal abatement 
costs (uniform carbon prices). Based on these data, a Marginal Abatement Costs 
(MAC) curve will be constructed. This can be exploited to assess the marginal 
costs for the EU of meeting different interpretations of how the ESR will affect the 
ESR emission reductions in 2030.  
 
The following interpretations are to be included: 
 
1a. A reduction in the CO2 emissions in the ESR sectors in 2030 as for total 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, i.e. 30% compared to the 2005 level. 
 
1b. A reduction in the CO2-emissions in ESR sufficient to meet the target in 
2030 even if no reductions take place of other GHGs in ESR. (Most other GHG 
emissions are related to the agricultural sector.) 
 
2a. As 1a, but the ESR-target is adjusted for possible flexibility vis-á-vis the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) sectors (100 Mt) and vis-á-vis 
the Land Use, Land Use-Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector (280 Mt), i.e. 
a total of 380 Mt. Since SNOW only model from a given reference situation in 
2030, 2a. assumes that the extra ESR emission budget is added linearly. This 
implies an extra budget of 76 Mt in 2030 (380 Mt x 2/10). 
 
2b. As 1b, but the ESR-target is adjusted for possible flexibility vis-á-vis the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) sectors (100 Mt) and vis-á-vis 
the Land Use, Land Use-Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector (280 Mt), i.e. 
a total of 380 Mt. Since SNOW only model from a given reference situation in 
2030, 2b. assumes that the extra ESR emission budget is added linearly. This 
implies an extra budget of 76 Mt in 2030 (380 Mt x 2/10). 
 
3a. As 1a, but the ESR-target is adjusted for possible flexibility vis-á-vis the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) sectors (100 Mt) and vis-á-vis 
the Land Use, Land Use-Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector (280 Mt), i.e. 
a total of 380 Mt. Since SNOW only model from a given reference situation in 
2030, 3a. assumes that 1/10 of the flexibility is used each budget year, i.e. 38 
Mt (380 Mt/10) in 2030. 
 
3b. As 1b, but the ESR-target is adjusted for possible flexibility vis-á-vis the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) sectors (100 Mt) and vis-á-vis 
the Land Use, Land Use-Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector (280 Mt), i.e. 
a total of 380 Mt. Since SNOW only model from a given reference situation in 
2030, 3b. assumes that 1/10 of the flexibility is used each budget year, i.e. 38 
Mt (380 Mt/10) in 2030. 
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All the shifts will be analysed as percentage changes from a reference situation R1: 
The 2030 solution of the European Commission (EC, 2016). 
 
Shift 1a og 1b will also be analysed as percentage changes from a reference 
situation R2: A scenario for 2030 consistent with the updated country-specific 
scenarios. 
 
The Norwegian Environment Agency (NEA) will provide SSB with the targets for 
2030 in Mt for all the policy shifts, as well as the percentage change from the 
reference scenarios (and/or the reference levels in Mt for 2030).  
 
The deliverable will contain a report from the analysis with a description of how 
the MAC curve for the EU’s ESR sectors is estimated, of the reference path and of 
the cost implications of the different interpretations of the ESR with uncertainty 
assessments. An excel file with the data basis for the MAC will also be provided. 
A.2 More on the quantifications and interpretations of the 
percentage reduction targets 
 
The data from NEA is provided in Table A.1. NEA has also given some 
supplementary information on the quantifications:  
 
In Scenario 1a. CO2 as well as other GHGs are reduced by 30% from 2005. 
Irrespective of the reference being R1 or R2, the CO2 emissions then amount to 
1 380 Mt in 2030. 
 
In Scenario 1b.no reductions are assumed to take place of other GHGs. Large 
reductions have already taken place in these emissions from 2005 until today, and 
in the references R1 and R2 even more is expected to come from 2015-2030 
according to the European Commission (EC) and the country-wise projections. In 
order to account for these, the targets for CO2 emissions are calculated based on the 
assumption that no additional reductions in other GHGs in the ESR sectors will 
come on top of those already included in the two scenarios.  
 
For Scenario R1 (based on EC) this implies a reduction of 32% in the CO2 
emissions, which renders the 2030 level at 1 341 Mt. For Scenario R2 (from the 
country-wise projections) this corresponds to a reduction of 33,8% for the CO2 
emissions by 2030 or to a level of 1 305 Mt.     
 
Flexibility outside NETS (shifts 2 and 3) lowers the emission reduction target. 
Shifts 1-3 correspond to policy scenarios 1-3 in Table 1.1. 
Table A.1 The scenarios and shifts (reduction targets, Mt CO2 and %) 
  
a: Same % reduction in all GHG 
gases 
b: No reduction in non-CO2  
emissions 
  from R1: 1515 
from R2: 1595 from R1: 1515 From R2: 1595 
  target red. % Target red. % target red. % Target red. % 
Shift 1: 2030 target 
corresponding to 30% 
reduction from 2005 1380 135 9 % 1380 215 13 % 1341 174 11 % 1305 290 18 % 
Shift 2: Adjusted with 
ETS and LULUCF 
flexibility linearly (76 
Mt.) 1456 59 4 % 1456 139 9 % 1417 98 6 % 1381 214 13 % 
Shift 3: Adjusted with 
ETS and LULUCF 
equally each year (38 
Mt.) 1418 97 6 % 1418 177 11 % 1379 136 9 % 1343 252 16 % 
Source: The Norwegian Environment Agency (Miljødirektoratet). 
  
Marginal abatement costs under EU’s effort sharing regulation Reports 2019/10     
30 Statistics Norway 
Appendix B: The data for the MAC curve  
Table B-1 shows the numbers behind the MAC curve shown in Figure 4.1. These 
are the results of simulating the SNOW model.  
Table B.1 MAC curve data: CO2 abatement and CO2 price in the NETS sectors  
Abatement  
(%) 
CO2 price 
(€/t CO2) 
0 0 
2 12 
4 25 
6 40 
9 64 
11 82 
13 102 
16 134 
18 158 
22 212 
25 258 
30 350 
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